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Abstract
Little is known about the effect of message framing on conservation 
behavior over time. In a randomized controlled trial with residential 
households, we use advanced metering and information technologies to test 
how different messages about household energy use impact the dynamics of
conservation behavior down to the appliance level. Our results, based on 374
million panel observations of kilowatt-hour (kWh) electricity consumption for 
118 households over 9 months, show that differences in behavioral 
responses due to message framing become more significant over time. We 
find that a health-based frame, in which households consider the human 
health effects of their marginal electricity use, induced persistent energy 
savings behavior of 8-10% over 100 days; whereas a more traditional cost 
savings frame, drove sharp attenuation of treatment effects after 2 weeks 
with no significant savings versus control after 7 weeks. We discuss 
implications for the design of effective information campaigns to engage 
households in conservation behavior.
Keywords: energy conservation, decision framing, repeated behavior,
randomized controlled trials
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1. Introduction
Information programs solve problems of imperfect information in 
markets—often helping individuals and institutions make better consumption
or investment decisions, and overcome cognitive or behavioral biases (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008, Ratner et. al., 2008). Information framing has been used
in a wide range of decision-making domains, including saving money for 
retirement (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007); paying for charity and performance 
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000); reducing poverty and improving access to 
financial institutions (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006); designing 
health behavior programs (Rothman and Salovey, 1997; Keller and Lehman, 
2008); and encouraging resource conservation (Schultz et.al., 2007). In this 
paper, we use information-based strategy to motivate household energy 
conservation. We provide experimental evidence from a randomized trial 
that non-price based framing interventions can be effective for conservation 
behavior over time. 
Typical framing interventions provide study subjects with alternative 
representations of a decision problem, e.g. framing a quantity as a gain or 
loss, shifting reference points, or manipulating a choice set (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levin, Schneider and 
Gaeth, 1998; Keren, 2011). Information framing effects are defined when the
manner in which stimuli are represented or “framed” to decision-makers 
affects its evaluation. Historically, framing research has been conducted in 
small-scale studies with short trials and one-shot decisions. While more 
recently, this research has moved from the laboratory to field experiments in
market settings (Levitt and List, 2009; List and Price, 2013), we still have 
limited understanding of the effectiveness of information framing on 
behavior over long time periods (Bernedo, Ferraro, and Price, 2014). 
Studying the dynamics of framing interventions is important because there is
a fundamental question about how long framing effects can last after initial 
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exposure, and what happens when decision frames are repeated. 
In this paper, we conduct a field experiment to analyze how framing 
interventions can affect residential energy consumption behavior over time. 
Understanding the potential mechanisms to reduce energy consumption is 
an essential part of addressing climate change (Davis and Gertler, 2015), 
since electricity generation accounts for over 40% of carbon emissions in the
United States. Residential and commercial buildings collectively account for 
over two-thirds of total U.S. energy consumption (EIA, 2014; EPA, 2013). 
Energy conservation can be achieved not only with technological changes in 
buildings and appliances, but also with behavioral changes in consumption 
(Asensio and Delmas 2015; Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Gillingham and 
Palmer, 2014; Harding and Hsiaw, 2014). 
In a fast growing experimental literature, scholars have demonstrated 
that tailored information programs have a tremendous potential for reducing 
household electricity use (Allcott 2011; Ayres, Raseman, and Shih, 2012; 
Costa and Kahn, 2013, Davis and Metcalf, 2014; Delmas and Lessem, 2014; 
Gilbert and Graff Zivin, 2013, Jacobsen, Kotchen and Vandenbergh, 2012). 
These studies report significant conservation effects using social 
comparisons and other normative appeals to conserve energy, which build 
on seminal work in psychology (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini, 
2003; Schultz et.al., 2007; Nolan et.al., 2008). Despite the popularity of this 
growing body of research, very little is currently known about the dynamics 
of household responses to norm-based behavioral interventions, and even 
less so at the appliance level. Conservation is not a one-time occurrence but 
requires repeated consumer effort and attention. Some responses may be 
immediate, others not; and currently, researchers have not been able to 
differentiate well between short- and long-run behavior change mechanisms 
in a framing intervention. A dynamic analysis of conservation behavior with 
real-time information strategies is lacking. 
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There are many reasons to expect that information framing could have
differential impacts on energy consumption over time. First, household 
conservation behavior such as turning off unused lights, unplugging charging
devices or reducing standby power, are habitual or event-based actions that 
might require timely information feedback to consumers about monetary or 
social costs. Consumers, however, receive infrequent information about the 
monetary costs of electricity (Gilbert and Graff Zivin, 2014; Jessoe and 
Rapson 2012; Ito 2014). Second, consumers are generally unaware, or 
unable to observe the negative externalities of their electricity consumption 
such as outside air pollution and related environmental health damages 
(Brunekreef and Holgate, 2002). These social costs of individual electricity 
use are also usually not reflected in prices for electricity services (National 
Research Council, 2010). From the above, we could expect that more salient 
information regarding these unobserved costs might influence judgments 
and decisions over time. In the present study, we offer new field evidence 
that framing effects—e.g. alternative representations of the external effects 
of household consumption decisions, either in terms of monetary or social 
costs—can dramatically alter energy savings behavior over time. 
We conduct a field experiment using advanced energy metering 
technologies with real-time energy use information provided to households 
at the appliance level. We give households information about unobserved 
monetary and social costs related to their electricity consumption. The use of
advanced metering and information technologies offers new benefits for 
behavioral research (Chen et al., 2014). First, information diffusion and 
feedback is relatively fast and can improve the salience of prices and 
quantities (Gilbert and Graff Zivin, 2014). Second, analytics data can be 
deployed to verify when and how households interact with information 
treatments or alerts. This is important because engagement analytics allow 
us to assess the effect of the actual treatment, that is to say when people 
access their energy feedback information, rather than just measuring the 
5
effect of the intent to treat, that is to say sending the email or making the 
information available on the dashboard.
Our results are based on 374 million high frequency panel observations
of kilowatt-hour (kWh) electricity consumption for 118 households observed 
over 9 months. While households respond immediately to tailored messages 
about their electricity use, the effectiveness of repeated messages on 
consumption behavior varies by decision frame. We find that a health-based 
frame, in which consumers consider the environmental and human health 
effects of their marginal electricity use, induced more persistent energy 
savings behavior over a 100-day treatment period; as compared to a more 
conventional savings frame over the same period. In other words, 
conservation was short-lived with cost savings framing, but was more 
persistent with environmental and health framing. These results indicate that
framing can be used as a strategy to overcome behavioral barriers, 
especially in settings where price-based policies may not be politically 
feasible or effective (Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel, 2011). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some 
background on possible mechanisms for behavioral changes in responses to 
high frequency messaging over time. Section 3 discusses the setting of the 
field experiment and Section 4 describes the experimental design. Section 5 
presents the econometric approach. Section 6 discusses the results by 
framing intervention including appliance dynamics and a concluding 
discussion follows. 
2. Background
2.1. Novelty and Repetition
Most households in the United States receive no information about 
their electricity usage apart from their monthly bills, which generally do not 
disaggregate across time periods or sources of usage. Because of this, most 
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households know little about their energy use patterns and its effects (Attari,
DeKay, Davidson, and de Bruin, 2010). As consumers receive tailored 
information about their electricity use in real time and by appliance through 
a dashboard, we posit that there is a novelty associated with the content of 
tailored information received (e.g. the new information provided) but also 
with the mode of communication in which it is received (e.g. the dashboard). 
We posit that the novelty effects associated with advanced metering and 
information technologies might facilitate consumer engagement and amplify 
the desire to act on alert-based information. In consumer research, high 
engagement or issue involvement has been linked with short-run 
responsiveness to framing interventions (Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy, 
1990; Millar and Millar, 2000). We expect that as households receive tailored 
information about the effects of their electricity use with advanced 
technologies, novelty effects could lead to immediate conservation behavior.
The novelty effect opens the question as to what happens over time 
when information treatments are repeated. We could expect repetition to 
lead to either increasing or decreasing conservation behavior over time. On 
one hand, if information diffusion is gradual and behavior change occurs 
relatively slowly, then we could expect increasing conservation behavior 
over time as more households learn and adopt energy saving practices. On 
the other hand, from a cognitive perspective, it is unlikely that repeated 
instances of a single intervention would continue to have the same effect 
each time and produce the same level of a target behavior, as individuals 
tend to be desensitized to repeated exposure to a given stimuli (Rogers and 
Frey, 2014). 
If novelty effects wear off over time, then we could expect repetition to
lead to gradually decreasing conservation behavior over time, as households
return to their normal consumption patterns. There are several possible 
reasons for this. When economic value is placed on time, inattention or 
outside opportunity costs may lead to a decreasing effect of treatment. 
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Households may simply lose motivation or gradually become inattentive to 
the information conveyed via the treatment. Alternatively, households might 
also face outside opportunity costs, and substitute other sources of 
behavioral savings in the household budget, which might be perceived to be 
less costly than monitoring electricity consumption. Recent supporting 
evidence for diminishing returns to normative information strategies have 
been shown in experimental research by Allcott and Rogers (2014), Gilbert 
and Graff-Zivin (2014) and Dolan and Metcalfe (2013). Accordingly, as 
tailored information received by households is repeated, conservation 
behavior might gradually decrease. 
The long-run outcomes of information strategies will also depend 
critically on the presentation of the decision problem. In other words, the 
manner in which the household conservation decision is framed or described 
to consumers will determine observed conservation levels over time. In this 
study, we are interested in comparing the immediate and then long run 
effects of a health frame versus a savings frame. 
2.2. Health Frame
We experiment with a health framing approach, which is designed to 
frame energy conservation as altruistic and raise the moral cost of energy 
use. We further explore the interest, initiated in Asensio and Delmas (2015) 
that framing conservation decisions on health externalities—that is, 
informing consumers about the environmental health damages associated 
with their individual electricity use, can motivate conservation behavior. A 
health framing approach to energy conservation focuses household 
consumption on the social costs of energy use through air pollution. 
Reframing conservation as a health concern can be motivational for many 
affected consumers, particularly for at-risk populations such as urban 
communities, families with children or those with asthmatics in the home 
(Asensio and Delmas, 2015; Neidell, 2004).
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Regarding the long run effectiveness of health framing, we know from 
a related body of evidence in psychology that individuals tend to resist 
becoming desensitized to a repeated stimulus if the stimulus is sufficiently 
intense (Rogers and Frey, 2014). This might be the case when learning that 
one’s excess electricity consumption may be causing direct harm on others 
(Asensio and Delmas 2015). As such, we posit that health framing might lead
to greater information retention, which could translate into more persistent 
behavioral effects over time. This is consistent with behavioral economic 
models of decision-making and morally motivated consumption behavior in 
markets (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum and Ditto, 
2009) as a non-price mechanism. 
2.3. Cost Savings Frame
By contrast, the cost savings approach to conservation follows 
standard reasoning about private benefits from household energy savings. 
Standard economic reasoning predicts that tailored information about private
benefits should motivate rational curtailment behavior towards energy 
efficiency. However, we have several reasons to believe that cost savings 
information may not have lasting effects. First, consumers may gradually 
become inattentive to information about electricity costs (Allcott and 
Greenstone 2012) especially as the savings potential is typically small. 
Second, cost savings information in market conditions may crowd out 
intrinsic motivations (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely, Bracha, Meier, 
2009; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011) particularly in situations where 
intrinsic motivations could be important considerations to engage in 
conservation behavior. Further, a recent meta-analysis of energy 
conservation field studies (Delmas, Fischlein and Asensio, 2013), shows that 
monetary incentives and information do not always lead consumers to save 
more and instead often lead to significant energy increases over time. 
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Thus, as households receive repeated information feedback about their
household electricity use, we test empirically whether a health frame will 
produce more lasting conservation effects versus a savings frame.
3. The Field Experiment
A randomized controlled trial was conducted with residential 
consumers to test our hypotheses. We provided real-time, appliance-level 
smart metering energy feedback to 118 residential households in a large 
residential community in Los Angeles over 9 months, which includes a 6-
month baseline period and a 100-day treatment period (14 consecutive 
weeks). We tested the effectiveness of two different messaging approaches 
based either on the environmental and health impacts of electricity 
consumption, or on the monetary savings of reducing electricity 
consumption. 
3.1 Experiment location and recruitment
Our field experimental site, University Village, is a multiple building, 
family apartment/condo-style housing complex in Los Angeles with 1,103 
units. All residents pay their own electricity bills. The community spans two 
census block groups serviced by the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power (LADWP). 
On a per capita electricity use basis, University Village residents are 
representative of middle-income California multi-family renter populations 
and are only slightly below the national average, due to the milder climate in
the State of California. Our 118 participating households consist of single, 
married and domestically partnered graduate college students with and 
without children in the home. Many residents are younger and more 
educated than the U.S. population (e.g. bachelor’s degree or higher), but are 
representative of users of information devices who fall in our target 
population of urban dwellers with and without children in the home; and who 
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increasingly rely on electronic communications in their daily lives. Thus, our 
experimental results are indicative of how future residential electricity 
consumers can respond to high frequency information, especially as electric 
utilities begin utilizing smart metering data with information and 
communication technologies (Edison, 2014). We note that our experimental 
results represent outcomes of real-life consumptions decisions in their 
natural settings. 
All units in the community are furnished with a common set of major 
appliances—a refrigerator, dishwasher, gas stove and microwave of similar 
make and model, which allows for standardization in the housing capital 
stock. This is an important feature of our field site and experimental design. 
With standardization in major appliances, we achieve more precise estimates
of behavioral savings than is otherwise possible without standardization in 
appliances. For an engineering overview of the real-time appliance level 
energy metering technology developed for this experiment, see Chen et al., 
(2015). We note that before the availability of advanced smart metering 
technology, there was also no readily available way to observe electricity 
consumption in real time, or perhaps at a high enough sampling frequency to
identify novelty effects with non-lasting actions, making it difficult to draw 
conclusions about the speed and magnitude of demand changes by 
individual consumers (Reiss and White, 2008).
Households were recruited to participate in the study. No direct 
environmental messaging was used in order to prevent biases in recruitment
selection. The recruitment process occurred within the context of several 
community events and information campaigns during the summer months 
prior to the start of the academic year. To meet Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) ethics requirements regarding research with human subjects, 
participation was strictly voluntary and no personally identifiable information
was collected or shared. We conducted an enrollment survey to capture 
basic apartment demographics and occupancy characteristics for the 
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community at-large, including households who opted in and those who opted
out of the study. We recruited many more willing participants than there 
were active equipment allotments. Among the 1,103 households at 
University Village, 226 households volunteered to participate and another 88
households in our entry survey chose not to participate. This equals a 
participation rate of 20%. We randomly selected 118 participating 
households from these 226 volunteers. The participating households in our 
experiment represent 10.7% of the population at University Village. No 
households entered into or dropped from the study for the entire duration of 
the experiment. No monetary rewards or financial incentives were offered for
participation.
We tested for potential differences in baseline characteristics between 
the total population of households at our field site and our sample of 
volunteer households. We compared the monthly electricity meter readings 
of the entire population of University Village with those of our participants, 
along with other observable characteristics, such as the size of the 
apartment, the number of occupants in each unit, the apartment floor and 
the location of the apartment in the complex. As shown in Table 1, there are 
no significant differences between participating and non-participating 
households. This analysis is based on electricity meter readings for 12 
months prior to the start of the experiment. 
***
Insert Table 1 about Here
***
4. Experimental design
Each participating household was randomly assigned to either one of 
the two treatment groups or to the control group. One group of households 
received energy use feedback with cost savings information. Another group 
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of households received energy use feedback with tailored information about 
the environmental health consequences of their consumption, specifically, 
pounds of air pollutant emissions and a listing of health consequences, 
namely, childhood asthma and cancer. Both treatment groups had access to 
an online dashboard that displayed real time electricity use data. The 
electricity consumption of the control group was observed, but this group did
not receive any information feedback about their electricity consumption 
apart from their normal monthly electricity bills. 
4.1. Information Display and Messaging
With the exception of the treatment messages, the dashboards for the 
health and financial groups were identical. The data presented on the 
dashboard included electricity consumption data for the past month, week, 
and day as well as real-time readings that would update every thirty 
seconds. In addition, a pie chart provided information about appliance usage.
Lastly, electricity consumption for the 10% most efficient apartments was 
calculated and presented on each apartment’s dashboard as a benchmark 
for energy efficiency.1 The online dashboard can be seen in Appendix 1 and 
was accessible to the participants any time. In addition, personalized weekly 
emails were sent to each household in both treatment groups. These emails 
summarized electricity consumption in the past week and provided a private,
password-protected link to view their online personal energy dashboard. The 
end-to-end architecture system designed to measure real-time, appliance-
level data and provide feedback to the households is described in Chen et al.
(2015).
The treatment messages translated consumed kilowatt-hours into 
dollars or health costs. We provided households with factual, evidence-based
numbers that depended on their weekly consumption. The representative 
messages for our two decision frames are shown below:
1 Since there was variation in occupancy across apartments, energy consumption was
scaled by the number of occupants in each household for the benchmark comparison to the 
most efficient apartment.
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1. Health frame: Last week, you used XX% more/less electricity than you 
efficient neighbors. You are adding/avoiding XX pounds of air 
pollutants, which contribute to known health impacts such as childhood
asthma and cancer.
2. Cost Savings frame: Last week, you used XX% more/less electricity 
than your efficient neighbors. In one year, this will cost you (you are 
saving) $XX dollars.
The typical savings potential for a median 2-bedroom apartment was 
about $79 per year, and ranged between $11 and $328 in 2012 USD. The 
typical amount of reduced emitted air pollutants for a median 2-bedroom 
apartment was about 979 lbs. and ranged between 131 lbs. and 4,058 lbs. of
criteria pollutants. These consider only annual non-baseload output 
emissions, e.g. the locally generated emissions attributed to meeting excess 
energy demand. Equivalent pounds of air pollutant emissions were 
calculated using emission factors from the Emissions & Generation Resource 
Integrated Database (eGRID) maintained by the U.S. EPA and based on 
LADWP electricity mix. Equivalent cost savings were calculated using 
household-level kWh consumption data and the published LADWP electric 
rate schedules for residential customers. 
We make two identifying assumptions for the estimation of treatment 
effects. First, treatment selection is independent of the behavioral response 
function, which is given by random assignment. Second, treatments are 
independent and mutually exclusive. We discuss consumer engagement and 
the use of Google Analytics page tracking to validate whether treatment 
assigned equals treatment received in Section 6.5.
4.2. Timeline and randomization
The randomized controlled trial was conducted from October 2011 to 
July 2012. The baseline period lasted 6 months and was followed by 100 
days (14 weeks) of treatment. In the baseline period, we observed the 
households’ electricity consumption but did not provide energy use 
information to the households. We initially allocated an equal number of 
14
units to each condition: 42 units in the control group and 42 and 43 
households respectively for health and cost savings groups. However, due to 
technical issues with some of the units in the control group, which were 
installed first, the final number of working units was 36 for the control 
group.2
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics by group for both treated and 
control households during the 6-month baseline period. The covariates and 
electricity consumption are reasonably balanced between treated and 
control households. In particular, the average electricity consumption 
reported in average kWh per day is statistically indistinguishable between 
groups along with other important household characteristics. The last column
in Table 1 shows the results of a regression testing for significant differences 
between groups similar to the approach used in Allcott (2011). As given by 
the F-test p-value of 0.2485, we reject a hypothesis of imbalance between 
groups, which provides an important check on randomization. One exception
is the variable representing membership in an environmental organization, a 
proxy for environmentalist households, which is significant at the 10 percent 
level (Table 1, last column). Households who report membership in an 
environmental organization in our sample represent a very minor share 
(~8%) of households in the study. In separate analyses, we computed the 
effects for households belonging to an environmental organization in our 
experiment. These results show no significant interaction of environmentalist
households with either treatment, meaning these households do not drive 
the study’s primary results.
***
Insert Table 2 about Here
2 Some of the units installed were omitted from the analysis due to technical issues 
with the metering equipment in these households. These technical issues mainly affected 
participants in the control group, who were the first set of households to have their metering
kits installed. Six households assigned to the control group were affected and therefore 
omitted from the analysis in consultation with the engineering team. See Chen, et al., 
(2015).
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***
5. Econometric Approach
Our experimental approach addresses methodological concerns 
identified in a meta-analytic review of the behavioral literature in energy 
conservation, namely, inclusion of an independent control group, 
randomization in experimental assignment, household demographic controls,
and weather and seasonality controls (Delmas, Fischlein and Asensio, 2013) 
for residential field studies. 
Evidence of the effectiveness of a randomized trial is may change over 
time. We carefully considered two alternative approaches to analyze the 
consumption dynamics: a moving window of analysis, with for instance, 
week-to-week energy savings in which prior history does not matter; or 
alternatively, a cumulative window of analysis from the start of treatment 
where the prior consumption history does matter. We decided to use a 
cumulative window of analysis to estimate energy savings over time because
cumulative energy savings is often the final metric of interest when 
measuring returns to behavioral interventions, particularly for policy and 
program evaluation.3 
For household j, in treatment group i, at time t, we estimate treatment 
effects of information provision with the following econometric model:
 (1)
We regress the electricity loads in kilowatt-hour per unit time Eijton a 
series of treatment group and event time indicators, where  Ti  is equal to 1 if 
the household belongs to treatment group i, and 0 otherwise; and  Pit is a 
post-treatment indicator equal to 1 during the post-treatment period, and 0 
3 In supplemental analyses, we also estimated weekly performance using a moving 
window. These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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during the baseline period. For convenience, the electricity usage has been 
normalized by dividing by the average post-period control group 
consumption in the experiment and multiplying by 100, which allows for 
direct interpretation of coefficients as percentage change (Allcott 2011). 
Treatment status is identified when the group-event time dummy is equal to 
1, and 0 otherwise, which allows for estimation of treatment effects by 
difference-in-differences (DID) with a control group of metered households 
who receive an electricity bill, but receive no additional information 
treatment. We estimate a series of treatment effects,  over a cumulative 
window of analysis from . The sampling rate for the kilowatt-hour 
electricity loads is 1/30 Hz, which is one reading every 30 seconds for all 
independently metered appliance signals in the community. We include 
household characteristics H j  weather controls , and where  and  are 
coefficient vectors. Day-by-week fixed effects are denoted by  and the 
residual error is captured in . Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
household level using the Arellano (1987) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix. In the absence of informative 
feedback, we assume counterfactual consumption levels follow a matched 
control group sample or statistical reference level, which is a standard 
practice in evaluating RCTs.
We performed specification tests on the choice between fixed or 
random effect estimators in our panel data set. Our results are not sensitive 
to either specification. A Hausman test favored the use of random effects 
with covariates so we used this in the current study. This approach is 
generally consistent with the prior experimental literature estimating 
heterogeneous population treatment effects and also avoids potential biases 
in estimating the time series error component (Nickell, 1981). 
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5.1 Household controls 
We condition on observable household characteristics that includes: 
apartment size, ranging from 1 to 3 bedrooms; the number of adults in the 
household, ranging from 1 to 3; the number of children in the household, 
ranging from 0 to 4; building floor in the residential complex ranging from 1 
to 3; and apartment floor plan measured in nominal square footage. Because
political leaning or ideology can also significantly impact energy efficiency 
attitudes and behaviors (Gromet, Kunreuther and Larrick, 2013; Costa and 
Kahn, 2013), we include a proxy variable equal to 1 when the head of 
household reports being a member of an environmental non-governmental 
organization (NGO), and 0 otherwise. In this way, we condition on greener 
participating households and capture an important source of heterogeneity. 
Additional unobservable characteristics that may be common to the 
community are also captured in the control group variation.
5.2 Seasonality and autocorrelation 
Electricity demand in kWh per unit time exhibits seasonality and serial 
correlation that depend on outside factors such as time of day or weather. 
Modeling electricity loads with high time-resolution data requires special 
consideration of seasonality and time-varying characteristics on 
consumption, most notably, the effects of outside temperatures on hourly 
energy demand. Even with the milder climate in Los Angeles, heating and 
cooling hours capture significant seasonal variation on electricity 
consumption. We calculate heating and cooling degree hours, using local 
weather data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). Outside temperatures were recorded hourly at the 
Santa Monica Municipal Airport weather station, located less than 1 mile 
from the study site. Degree-hours capture seasonal heating or cooling 
requirements at a finer resolution than degree-days, and is a common 
approach in energy economics to model the influence of outside temperature
18
fluctuation on patterns of energy demand (Reiss and White 2008, Appendix 
B). The hourly updating weather vector is :
 (2)
As shown in Eq. (2), the larger the indoor heating or cooling 
requirement, the larger is the linear distance between the measured mean 
hourly outside temperature  and the indoor base temperature, which by 
U.S. convention is defined as 65˚F/18.3˚C (Day and Karayiannis 1998). When
outside temperatures rise above the base temperature, cooling degree hours
are strictly positive and heating degree hours are zero. Conversely, when 
outside temperatures fall below the base temperature, heating degree hours 
are strictly positive and cooling degree hours are zero. In this way, the 
differential effects of heating and cooling on kWh electricity consumption are
decomposed in a meaningful way over a 24-hour period. In addition to 
seasonal degree-hours, we also specify day-by-week dummies to capture 
common time trends (or cycles) in the data and any calendar shocks on 
consumption. 
***
Insert Figure1 about Here
***
6. Results
We obtained data on electricity consumption at high frequency of 1/30 
Hz, one reading every 30 seconds, which we note is currently the state-of-
the-art in high-frequency smart metering technology. We obtained an 
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unbalanced panel of 53,437,110 kWh observations at the 30-second 
sampling frequency.4 Across all 6 measured appliance categories (e.g. 
heating and cooling, lighting, plug load [e.g. all items plugged into wall 
outlets], refrigerator, dishwasher and other kitchen appliances), this gives a 
total sample size in this study of 374,059,770 panel observations. At 374 
million kWh observations, our sample is one of the largest and highest 
resolution data sets to date in a behavioral study. We also begin to shed light
on conservation behavior for individually metered appliances. 
6.1. The Salience of novelty
In this section, we study the hypothesis that novelty effects with 
advanced metering and information technologies can lead to immediate 
behavioral changes in consumption. In Figure 1, we plot the dynamic 
treatment effects (DTEs) after the start of information treatments. The DTEs 
are shown in percentage change versus the control group and net of all 
controls, including outside weather variation. The thin lines in Figure 1 
denote upper and lower 95% confidence intervals. By convention, negative 
values in percentage change mean energy savings (conservation behavior) 
and positive values in percentage change mean energy increases (splurging 
behavior) relative to control. 
Consistent with the novelty hypothesis, there is a large and immediate 
conservation effect under both decision frames as shown in Figure 1. We 
report significant effects within the first day of treatment for the health 
group, and within 2 days (approximately 43 hours) for the cost savings 
group. For both treatment groups, we observe substantial adjustments in 
consumption within 48 hours of the initial treatment. These effects also 
persist throughout the day and early evening, which indicates both 
immediate load shifting and conservation behavior. 
4 Some observations were lost due to wireless signal transmission from the metering 
equipment. These were relatively short periods reflecting the number of working units and 
aggregate signal. We tested to confirm these time observations were missing at random and
uncorrelated with treatment status or household characteristics. 
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6.2.Peak Energy Savings
Having demonstrated that electricity usage feedback can drive 
immediate behavioral savings, we estimated hourly treatment effects in 
event time to understand what can be learned about the magnitudes of 
savings under our two framing approaches. Treatment status for the 
experiment begins at approximately 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday mornings, when 
the weekly e-mail alerts were sent to participants for 14 consecutive weeks 
(~100 days). In Table 2, we report peak conservation, which we define as the
highest energy savings achieved after the start of information treatments. 
The resulting peak conservation times, magnitudes, and elapsed hours are 
all summarized by group in Table 2.  
***
[Insert Table 2 about here]
***
By time-of-day, peak conservation occurs between 6:00 p.m. (18:00) 
and 7:00 p.m. (19:00) in the evening, when most residents are getting home 
and this is just before peak consumption occurs for the community-at-large 
at approximately 9:00pm (21:00). At peak consumption for the community, 
the relative magnitudes of the energy savings are considerable: we observe -
15.7% peak conservation under the cost savings frame and -21.7% peak 
conservation under the health frame (Table 2). However, as shown in Table 
2, the amount of time to reach peak savings differs substantially by group. 
Peak energy savings occurs after 176 hours (7 days of treatment) for the 
cost savings group but occurs after only 8 hours (within 1 day) for the health 
group. We do find evidence for rapid behavioral changes in consumption by 
both groups in the short run, however, the health group responded more 
quickly to the treatment.
What would a household need to be doing to achieve this level of 
conservation? For example, at standard nameplate wattages for common 
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household appliances, to achieve 15-22% savings at peak conservation 
would require all treated households at University Village apartments to 
simultaneously reduce the equivalent energy as consumed in 24-30 minutes 
of 2 compact fluorescent light bulbs, 12-18 minutes of a laptop use, or 5-6 
minutes of a 40 inch flat panel TV per day. In the next section, we further 
explore the magnitudes of the energy savings in terms of the underlying 
appliance categories. In related work, Reiss and White (2008) provide an 
excellent discussion of how much households would have to do to conserve a
large amount as a result of price shocks and other public appeals.
Our results are generally consistent with experimental evidence by 
Gilbert and Zivin (2014) and Allcott and Rogers (2014) who also document 
that the greatest magnitudes of energy savings occur early in an 
information-based intervention, often on the first day households receive 
their home energy reports. Although in prior studies, the exact time of 
information delivery is typically unobserved, as the authors report intent-to-
treat effects around a fixed window surrounding the mailing of the home 
energy reports. We distinguish these dynamic treatment effects from our 
own results because in our experimental setup, we are additionally able to 
track live page views with Google Analytics data (Figure 3; Appendix 3) in 
which we show very high compliance to treatment using information 
technologies. We discuss implications of analytics tracking on strategies for 
consumer engagement in Section 6.5
6.3.Behavioral Durability
We extended our analysis to 100 days of treatment, which is the 
approximate duration of a typical information campaign during peak winter 
or summer months (Delmas, Fischlein, Asensio 2013). Figure 1 shows the 
dynamic treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals over the full 
treatment horizon. Figure 2 shows the distribution of daily treatment effects 
in the study. The supporting point estimates are shown in Table 3A and 3B at
regular intervals for the first week of treatment (novelty period - Table 3A) 
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and for subsequent weeks (repetition period - Table 3B). Here we evaluate 
what is referred to as in-treatment persistence, that is, the persistence of 
treatment effects while households are still receiving information. 
Persistence during the in-treatment period is also sometimes referred to as 
the durability of treatment. In this study, we do not report behavioral effects 
after information treatments have been lifted, although this is promising 
area of further study (see Allcott and Rogers, 2014). 
***
[Insert Table 3A and 3B about here]
***
Following peak conservation, we observe significant but decreasing 
durability of treatment effects over time. This is consistent with decreasing 
returns to information, although the dynamic responses follow markedly 
different consumption profiles, depending on the household assignment. For 
households who received cost savings messages, the effects decay very 
rapidly. Consumption patterns for cost savings households are not 
statistically different from the control group after about 7 weeks (Table 3B). 
By the end of 100-day experimental monitoring period, we observe no 
significant conservation behavior for cost savings households. As such, we 
say that the cost savings frame has poor durability. 
For households randomly assigned to receive health messages, the 
effects decay at a much lower rate from peak conservation. The health 
strategy has very high durability. By the end of the experimental monitoring 
period, the net energy savings are approximately range between 8-10%, 
which is on the high end of prior experimental studies with social norm-
based approaches. 
6.4.  Appliance Dynamics
We can additionally decompose the dynamic responses at the 
appliance level. Here we document that conservation behavior may be 
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simultaneously observed in certain appliance-level consumption categories 
and not others. Appendix 2 for example shows the appliance dynamics for 
the lighting, heating and cooling, plug load [i.e. all items plugged into the 
wall outlets], refrigerator, dishwasher and other kitchen appliances. Lighting 
conservation is the most persistent form of behavior change observed 
experimentally for both treatment groups. While this is certainly evidence 
that households have adopted new energy savings practices particularly in 
lighting consumption versus the control group, interestingly, we observe 
markedly different appliance behaviors over time by decision frame. 
In the health frame, the strong persistence of energy savings behavior 
is mainly driven by household changes in (a) plug load management, (b) 
lighting conservation and (c) space heating and cooling (Appendix 2). It turns
out that as a share of household appliances, plug load is the largest share 
(28-32%) of total energy use in the community, so plug load management, 
heating/cooling (19-26%), and lighting (14-15%) conservation drive the 
strong behavioral durability in the health group over time. 
In contrast, the weak behavioral durability of energy savings in the 
cost savings frame is mainly attributable to strong energy consumption 
rebounds at the appliance level, particularly in heating and cooling and plug 
load usage (Appendix 2). For heating and cooling, we initially observe 
conservation and then after about 40 days of treatment we observe evidence
of a direct “rebound” that produces an increase in consumption. Energy 
rebounds are known and commonly discussed in the literature on energy 
efficiency (Gilliangham, Kotchen, Rapson, Wagner, 2013; Azevedo 2014), but
to our knowledge, this is the first direct evidence of a rebound at the 
appliance level. However, these rebounds in consumption were not strong 
enough to compensate for significant behavioral changes in lighting 
conservation, which were effective but represent a relatively low appliance 
share (14-15%) versus the other appliance categories. 
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Surprisingly, treatment appears to cause an increase in energy use of 
the refrigerator in both treatments. Conservation behavior as it relates to 
refrigerator usage consists mostly of adjusting the refrigerator temperature 
settings. Surprisingly, we observe an average 8% increase in refrigerator 
loads for both treatment groups versus control. We verified all 
measurements with the engineering team to confirm the appliance 
consumption. Discussion during our focus group conducted after the study 
revealed that people were unclear on how to operate the analog refrigerator 
controls. As a result, many treated households wrongly adjusted the 
refrigerators settings to what they thought would be warmer temperatures, 
but in fact were colder temperatures, thereby increasing rather than 
decreasing their electricity use. Due to a less than optimal design in the 
control system, it seems that treated households increased their 
consumption versus the control group, which we interpret as an opportunity 
for the manufacturer to improve designs. This finding is consistent with the 
work of Attari et al. (2010) that highlights the importance of consumer 
perception and cognitive ability on the effectiveness of environmental 
behaviors. 
In conclusion, our results show that framing has dramatic implications 
with regard to effectiveness and changes in underlying appliance behaviors. 
While this phenomenon certainly raises new questions and need for further 
research about why framing should lead to variation in appliance-level 
responses, we provide new evidence on the effectiveness of appliance-level 
behaviors in response to a causal treatment. 
6.5. Consumer Engagement
In many empirical settings, scholars often assume that treatment 
assigned equals treatment received (Manski 1996). In practice however, 
some subjects comply with randomly assigned treatments, while others do 
not. 
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Using Google analytics data, we provide evidence for high compliance 
rates to our information treatments by using a unique household identifier 
for each login when participants visited our website. Google analytics can 
track users in real-time as they navigate a website and provide metrics to 
characterize the interactions between users, the displayed content and 
revealed activity patterns in response to information treatments. This 
information can be useful to understand the effectiveness of a treatment and
also to verify whether treatment effects on populations should be adjusted to
reflect low compliance rates. A similar capability should become available at 
scale as electric utilities deploy smart meters and online billing schemes 
(Edison, 2014).
We observe a high level of website engagement. In our study, 100% of 
treated households visited the website to view the displayed treatment 
messages at least once and sometimes multiple times per day, most 
commonly by clicking through our weekly feedback emails. We list 
descriptive statistics for new page entrances and other metrics by treatment 
group in Appendix 3. Page entrances, as defined by Google, are counted on 
the first pageview or screenview hit of an individual session. Our health 
treatment group had 752 total page entrances. Over approximately 98 days 
of tracking, this was an average engagement of 1.27 page entrances per 
week per household. Over the same period, the cost savings group had 260 
page entrances for an average engagement of 0.43 page entrances per 
week per household. Households in the health group were therefore 
significantly more engaged than those in the cost savings group.
Appendix 3 shows descriptive statistics for various measures of 
engagement by treatment group and by day of the week. We report several 
measures of website engagement including weekly pageviews by group, 
unique pageviews (which do not count repeat visitors in a single session), 
time on page in milliseconds, and total events (which count all website 
interactions within pages such as clicks and mouseovers). While all visual 
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information between treatment groups was identical, except for the 
treatment message itself, we see that the health group dominates the cost 
savings group in all the reported measures of engagement. Households in 
the health group viewed the pages more often, clicked more often and 
stayed longer on the website. These differences are statistically significant at
the 1% level (Table 4A in Appendix 3). 
We also observe the greatest number of initial page entrances on 
Tuesdays, which was the particular day of the week in which we sent 
participants weekly reminders with their electricity usage feedback 
(Appendix 3). This is also depicted in Figure 3, which shows weekly spikes of 
daily visits. This result suggests that alert-based reminders can be effective 
at directing users and that the timing of these reminders is an important 
factor driving engagement with information technologies. We also conducted
a series of supplemental analyses to understand whether greater 
conservation effects could be identified for households with higher 
engagement metrics. We examined both cross-sectional results and 
engagement over time and found no interaction or additive effect of 
marginal page entrances (or other measures of engagement) on 
conservation beyond the primary treatments. This suggests that user 
engagement appears to be a necessary but not sufficient criterion for 
conservation behavior. 
***
Insert Figure 3 about here
***
6.6Robustness Checks 
As robustness checks on our estimates, we considered both sampling 
intervals and clustering options in order to distinguish statistically trivial from
substantively important treatment effects. First, we compared results based 
on different sampling frequencies. We carefully considered the effects of a 
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large effective sample size for this case given a fixed N and large T 
dimension across households. We aggregated electricity consumption over 
fifteen- and thirty-minute intervals as well as hourly and daily electricity 
readings in order to validate our statistical inference at various sampling 
intervals, which upheld our general results. We report results at our native 
sampling frequency of 1/30 Hz, and also provide supplemental regressions 
using fixed effects models with hourly data in Tables 6A and 6B in Appendix 
4. The results and response dynamics are quantitatively similar. 
Serial correlation can have a large downward bias on standard errors in
difference-in-difference models because the right-hand-side variables may 
be highly correlated through time. This problem is irrelevant for DID models 
when only two time periods are compared, but it can lead to a severe bias to 
conventional standard error estimates in longer series. This common time 
series pitfall of ignoring error correlation within group or time clusters has 
been well-documented in Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004) and as a 
result, many empirical papers adjust standard errors by implementing one-
way clustering on the panel’s group dimension, adding time fixed effects to 
absorb any common shocks as standard practice—an approach we advocate 
in this paper with the introduction of more rigorous weather controls. We 
further explored double clustering on both the panel’s group and time 
dimension to compute more conservative standard errors that may be robust
to correlation along two dimensions. In supplemental analyses, we 
implemented multi-way clustering using procedures described in Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller (2011) and Thompson (2011) to account for dependence 
in group and time dimensions. Our results are robust to sampling frequency, 
double clustering and various assumptions about the variance-covariance 
matrix with respect to inference.
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7. Discussion
Scholars have only recently started to investigate the long-term effects
of information-based behavioral interventions on conservation behavior. This
study contributes to a developing body of work that examines the most 
effective information strategies to motivate lasting conservation behavior. 
Our analysis builds upon prior work by Asensio and Delmas (2015) but 
extends this earlier work along three important experimental dimensions. 
First, we include data at a 30 second sampling interval, which allows us to 
identify changes in behavior at a very high resolution. Second, we report 
data on website analytics, which allows us to observe household 
engagement with the treatment to confirm that the households accessed the
information provided. Third, we shed light on dynamic responses at the 
appliance level.
We wish to emphasize four principal results. First, framing has 
important implications for the dynamics of energy conservation behavior and
the evolution of treatment effects over time. We document that framing 
interventions can nudge consumers to change electricity use behavior in 
aggregate and at the appliance level. By introducing orthogonal framing 
treatments, we build on the earlier observation by Gilbert and Graff Zivin 
(2014) that some behavioral “nudges” are transitory, while others can shift 
the steady state and lead to new patterns of consumption. With 
experimental evidence from a randomized trial, we show very strong in-
treatment persistence with a health-based framing approach to energy 
conservation, and very weak in-treatment persistence with the more 
commonly used cost savings frame. By introducing framing into the 
conservation problem, we demonstrate the power of information as a non-
price mechanism for behavior change. Second, consistent with our novelty 
hypothesis, behavior change with information technologies can be 
immediate. We show that when novelty effects are present and feedback 
delays are short, the behavioral savings by consumers can be immediate: 
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within a matter of hours, and not over a span of weeks or months as 
observed in prior literature. This implies that information-based alerts are not
only effective potential means of achieving curtailment goals, but are also 
effective at shifting electricity use load patterns from peak to off-peak 
periods. This latter point, however, requires further study. Third, given the 
timescale for behavioral changes in the current study, we show that peak 
behavioral savings with norm-based policy instruments are typically under-
identified without the appropriate measurement frequency, particularly in 
standard 30-day residential billing cycles. Some treatments may last, others 
not. Finally, dynamic responses to framing interventions can occur without 
changes to existing billing rates, pricing structures or available monetary 
incentives. Timely information about consumption and its external effects 
can provide great value to consumers. We argue that behavioral 
interventions with information strategies can be important complements to 
price-based policies.
The emergence of real-time consumer data should bring a shift in the 
research agenda on how to design and enhance the timing and duration of 
information framing approaches to meet energy conservation or policy goals.
We note that our randomized trial allows for direct causal interpretations of 
framing effects over time, while controlling for observable community 
characteristics and other unobservable characteristics to the extent they are 
represented in the control group. Our results described in this study are 
generally indicative of anticipated behavior in urban, multi-family renter 
populations with and without children in the home. 
Our research is not without limitations. First, while we expect some 
attenuation of treatment effects in larger study populations, we acknowledge
that other possible sources of heterogeneity (for example, political affiliation,
computer literacy, Internet availability, age of the capital stock of household 
appliances, and kWh distribution of household energy uses) may become 
important sources of variation in larger populations. We have controlled for 
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these characteristics to the best of our ability, notably by extending previous
methodologies to include, but not limited to: standardized appliances in the 
residential field site which allow for more precise estimates, rigorous weather
controls, a political proxy for environmental leaning, and unrestricted access 
to Internet in households. Further research can be scaled to other residential 
communities, particularly urban households or susceptible populations for 
which concerns about air pollution or high energy costs may be particularly 
salient. Second, while our study covers changes in energy conservation over 
9 months, we do not study the persistence of these behavioral changes after 
the conclusion of the study. Further research should test how interventions 
can produce changes in behavior that persist even after the interventions 
are discontinued (Rogers and Frey, 2014).
Another important limitation on generalizability is the cause-effect 
attribution of the unobserved externalities. As in standard framing theory, we
convert consumed kilowatt-hours into equivalent costs or pounds of air 
pollutant emissions. In the health decision frame, the main mechanism 
linking electricity consumption to environmental health damages is the 
calculated pounds of equivalent emissions, which is tailored to the individual 
household and region. We acknowledge that emissions and health impacts 
can be geographically separate from the originating point of use. Thus, some
caution must be taken in ascribing tailored individual household emissions to
specific health impacts on the community. 
The current study provides a starting point for unanswered theoretical 
questions on the role of framing theory and habit-forming behavior at the 
appliance level. While outside the initial scope of this investigation, further 
research should seek to understand the nature of information framing effects
and the psychological basis of persistence in important appliance categories,
which we identified in this study. Finally, we recognize that if the monetary 
incentives are large enough, consumers will change behavior. In our 
experiment, the average monthly cost savings potential for a typical 2 
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bedroom family apartment versus the top 10% most energy efficient 
neighbors of similar size ranges between $6.00-$8.00 USD per month 
($72.00 to $96.00 USD per year). Thus, while energy costs are small relative 
to the U.S. household budget, the potential energy savings achieved by 
participating households could be larger or longer lasting with larger 
magnitudes of savings. Further research to understand thresholds, either in 
terms of cost savings or size of emissions externalities might shed further 
light on the sensitivity of information provision to the persistence of 
conservation behaviors.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we use information-based strategy to motivate consumer
decision-making about household energy conservation. We show that 
tailored information disclosures about the environmental and health 
implications of household electricity use can be very salient with residential 
consumers and lead to more lasting behavioral effects versus framing based 
on cost savings. Conservation is short-lived when the curtailment decision is 
framed as a monetary reward and is more persistent when it is framed as a 
health-based community concern. We build on a body of literature by 
behavioral economists and psychologists on the importance of social utility 
in household consumption decisions, particularly in settings where monetary 
incentives may not work to modify behavior (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002;
Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel, 2011). We show that the framing of choices can 
play an important role in the behavioral persistence of curtailment behaviors.
These differences become more significant over time. 
We started by emphasizing the potential benefits of the development 
of information technologies for behavioral and experimental research to 
evaluate social programs. As our research indicates, the successful use of 
these technologies requires a deeper understanding of individual behavior 
and the factors that drive the private provision of public goods. While the 
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research so far has emphasized macro effects on the diffusion of greener 
technologies (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; Rubin, et al., 2004), our 
research demonstrates the advantages of a more micro and dynamic 
approach to understanding consumer responses to innovation and 
technology-assisted behavior change. From a managerial perspective, to 
provide useful insights and decision-making support in meeting energy 
conservation goals, managers must be capable of framing the appropriate 
analytical solutions. 
This paper contributes to an emerging literature on behavioral 
“nudges” as non-monetary strategies for behavior change (Camerer et al., 
2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Ratner et al., 2008). We introduce framing 
and provide new technology-based approaches to evaluate both the duration
and magnitude of information framing effects, specifically in consumption 
settings that enhance consumer welfare through disclosure of unobserved 
externalities. This paper also extends framing theory (Soman, 2004; Chong 
and Druckman, 2007) by designing equivalency frames in the residential 
electricity sector that can alter behavior. We also contribute to the resource 
conservation literature on intrinsic motivations for pro-environmental 
behavior (Steg and Vlek, 2009; Kollmus and Agyeman, 2010; Delmas, 
Fischlein and Asensio, 2013; Van der Linden 2015). Information framing can 
be used as a general consumer strategy, particularly in settings where price-
based policies may not be politically feasible or effective. With regard to the 
effectiveness of behavioral strategies, we argue that the relative importance 
of the environmental health effects of air pollution on household electricity 
consumption has been under-emphasized in consumer decision-making; and 
the relative importance of cost savings information has been over-
emphasized. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Participating versus Non-Participating
Households
at University Village (Meter Readings Data)
Participatin
g
Households
(S.D.)
Non-
Participat
ing
Househol
ds
(S.D.)
Differenc
e 
Participat
ing vs. 
non-
participat
ing
(S.D.)
Test for 
significan
t 
Differenc
es
Participat
ing vs. 
non-
participat
ing
 (S.E.)
Electricity Consumption §
      Average kWh per day 8.429
(15.2)
8.737
(28.7)
.3070
(32.5)
-.0004
(.0004)
      kWh per square foot .2007
(.339)
.2043
(.479)
.0036
(.587)
.0833
(.198)
      kWh per person 42.53
(68.5)
44.72
(108.8)
2.18
(128.6)
-.0003
(.0009)
Square Footage 859.79
(106.3)
868.83
(98.54)
9.04
(144.9)
-.0001
(.0002)
Number of bedrooms 1.97
(.379)
1.97
(.343)
-0.003
(.511)
-.0263
(.160)
Number of bathrooms 1.60
(.490)
1.65
(.474)
.05
(.681)
.0143
(.040)
Number of occupants 4.03
(.566)
4.01
(.512)
-.02
(.763)
-.0107
(.126)
Building Floor 2.08
(.808)
2.08
(.786)
.002
(1.12)
-.0308
(.021)
Location in Complex 
       (1 if Sawtelle, 0 if 
Sepulveda)
.543
(.498)
.596
(.491)
.053
(.699)
-.041
(.040)
Number of Households 118 986 1,104 1,104
Number of Observations 5,533 46,184 51,718 51,718
F-test p-value - - 0.669
§ Based on 12 months of independent electricity meter readings. Coefficients for kWh
per square foot and kWh per person are based on independent regressions. No significant
differences are found. 
41
Table 2 Comparison of Baseline Characteristics 
Between Treated and Control Households
I.
Control
Group
(S.D.)
II.
Treatmen
t Group 1:
(S.D.)
III.
Treatme
nt
Group
2: (S.D.)
IV.
Difference
Treat 1-
Control 
(S.D.)
V.
Difference
Treat 2 –
Control
(S.D.)
VI.
Test for 
significan
t 
Difference
s
Participat
ing vs. 
non-
participati
ng (S.E.)  
Average kWh usage/Day 8.660 7.543 7.457 -1.118 -1.204 -0.000377
(7.623) (6.485) (6.672) (10.01) (10.13) (0.00195)
Apartment Size 
(bedrooms) 2.043 1.980 1.914 -0.063 -0.128 -0.153
(0.394) (0.339) (0.358) (0.520) (0.532) (0.205)
No. of Adults 1.968 1.970 1.847 0.002 -0.122 -0.105
(0.175) (0.271) (0.360) (0.322) (0.401) (0.106)
No. of Children 0.653 0.425 0.480 -0.227 -0.172 -0.0562
(0.800) (0.874) (0.713) (1.184) (1.072) (0.0572)
Floor Plan (Square 
Footage) 877.66 867.17 846.04 -10.49 -31.62 0.000203
(97.451) (97.019) (108.761) (137.51) (146.03) (0.000674)
Building Floor 2.163 1.919 2.103 -0.244 -0.060 -0.0494
(0.861) (0.813) (0.760) (1.184) (1.148) (0.0501)
Member Environmental 
Organization 0.024 0.119 0.082 0.096 0.058 0.157*
(0.152) (0.324) (0.274) (0.358) (0.313) (0.0835)
Number of Observations 119,609 187,684 183,701 307,293 426,902 371,385 
Number of Households 33 43 42 76 75 118
F-test p-value 0.2485
6 month baseline period (no electricity use feedback) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2. Peak Conservation
Strategy
Peak
Conservation 
(% energy
savings 
vs. control)
Peak
Conservation
Time of Day
Elapsed
Hours After
Initial
Treatment
Net
Conservation
after 100
days
Monetary Savings
Group -15.7% 6:00-7:00pm 176 hrs. Not significant
Health Group -21.7% 6:00-7:00pm 8 hrs. -10.0%
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Control Group* N/A N/A N/A N/A
* By experimental design, control group receives no information.
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Table 3A. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention
First Treatment Period: Novelty
Dependent variable: kWh @ 1/30 
Hz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 hour 6 hours 12 hours 18 hours 24 hours 36 hours 48 hours 1 week
Experimental
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group
-5.474 -8.394 8.103 -0.869 -3.202 -2.074 -8.064*** -15.56***
(-13.69) (-10.93) (-6.88) (-4.996) (-4.034) (-3.578) (-3.088) (-3.369)
     Post-Treat*Health Group -19.57*** -21.43*** -5.999 -9.411** -10.59*** -9.523** -13.03*** -9.962***
(-5.987) (-5.202) (-4.127) (-4.361) (-3.886) (-3.893) (-3.915) (-3.037)
Household Characteristics
     Adults -1.325 -1.404 -1.447 -1.443 -1.491 -1.446 -1.425 -2.025
(-8.963) (-9.009) (-8.992) (-8.978) (-8.958) (-8.931) (-8.894) (-8.726)
     Children 10.24** 10.24** 10.23** 10.22** 10.22** 10.25** 10.27** 10.33**
(-4.288) (-4.285) (-4.282) (-4.277) (-4.276) (-4.265) (-4.258) (-4.221)
     Apartment Size (No. of bedrooms) 44.82** 44.64** 44.49** 44.38** 44.33** 44.19** 43.91** 43.21**
(-18.21) (-18.21) (-18.2) (-18.2) (-18.19) (-18.14) (-18.1) (-17.85)
     Floor Plan (nominal square 
footage)
-0.0436 -0.0434 -0.0426 -0.0424 -0.0422 -0.042 -0.0413 -0.0403
(-0.0627) (-0.0626) (-0.0626) (-0.0626) (-0.0626) (-0.0625) (-0.0624) (-0.0615)
     Building Floor 9.286*** 9.255*** 9.214*** 9.178*** 9.158*** 9.088*** 9.009*** 9.111***
(-3.438) (-3.435) (-3.434) (-3.432) (-3.431) (-3.418) (-3.405) (-3.356)
     Member of Environmental 
Organization
-8.181 -8.099 -7.967 -7.84 -7.823 -7.767 -7.553 -8.444
(-9.144) (-9.191) (-9.234) (-9.264) (-9.264) (-9.259) (-9.299) (-8.982)
Weather Controls
     Heating Degree Hours 0.656** 0.658** 0.666** 0.653** 0.653** 0.666** 0.650** 0.644**
(-0.274) (-0.274) (-0.274) (-0.274) (-0.274) (-0.273) (-0.273) (-0.273)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.840*** -0.838*** -0.829*** -0.839*** -0.841*** -0.827*** -0.835*** -0.834***
(-0.209) (-0.209) (-0.209) (-0.209) (-0.209) (-0.208) (-0.208) (-0.205)
Day-by-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 33.62 33.91 33.68 33.88 33.99 33.95 34.22 35.58
(-31.42) (-31.46) (-31.44) (-31.4) (-31.37) (-31.29) (-31.2) (-30.77)
Number of Observations 27,531,13
2
27,601,36
7
27,669,23
8
27,735,09
4
27,802,42
5
27,941,28
9
28,079,52
6
29,404,74
0Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.0231 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 0.0232 0.0233 0.0233 0.0241
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3B. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention
  Repeated Weekly Treatment: Persistence 
Dependent variable: kWh @ 
1/30 Hz (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
  2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks 7 weeks 8 weeks 9 weeks 10weeks
11
weeks
12
weeks
13
weeks
14
weeks
Experimental  
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group -14.23***
-
13.38**
*
-
12.18**
*
-
9.816**
*
-
8.288**
* -6.826** -5.236 -3.932 -2.931 -1.870 -1.087 -0.639 -0.212
(-3.518) (-3.609) (-3.031) (-3.008) (-3.166) (-3.39) (3.678) (3.846) (3.934) (4.050) (4.149) (4.236) (4.297)
     Post-Treat*Health Group
-12.31***
-
11.67**
*
-
11.52**
*
-
11.79**
*
-
11.54**
*
-
11.17**
*
-
10.96**
*
-
10.80**
*
-
10.97**
*
-
10.56**
*
-
10.09**
*
-
9.980** -10.12**
(-3.021) (-3.032) (-2.959) (-3.059) (-3.184) (-3.249) (3.348) (3.419) (3.630) (3.731) (3.837) (3.889) (3.934)
Household Characteristics  
     Adults -1.02 -0.752 -0.879 -0.603 -0.719 -0.545 -0.655 -0.0741 0.216 0.227 0.308 0.611 0.724
(-8.548) (-8.369) (-8.197) (-8.01) (-7.836) (-7.806) (7.884) (7.924) (7.948) (8.062) (8.235) (8.272) (8.166)
     Children 10.49** 10.54** 10.42** 10.41*** 10.22** 10.25** 10.24*** 10.27*** 10.34*** 10.30*** 10.33*** 10.45*** 10.56***
(-4.154) (-4.097) (-4.072) (-4.037) (-4.011) (-3.983) (3.973) (3.976) (3.984) (3.997) (4.006) (4.006) (4.007)
     Apartment Size (No. of 
bedrooms) 42.29** 40.57** 39.99** 38.31** 36.48** 34.42** 32.18* 31.05* 29.70* 29.19* 28.42* 27.61 26.81
(-17.59) (-17.42) (-17.29) (-17.08) (-16.96) (-16.9) (16.92) (16.93) (16.97) (17.04) (17.12) (17.19) (17.26)
     Floor Plan (nominal square 
footage) -0.0408 -0.0394 -0.0391 -0.0356 -0.0303 -0.0239 -0.0165 -0.0124 -0.00914 -0.00727 -0.00543-0.00313 0.000313
(-0.0605) (-0.06) (-0.0597) (-0.0595) (-0.0594) (-0.0596) (0.0600) (0.0604) (0.0606) (0.0611) (0.0617) (0.0620) (0.0623)
     Building Floor 9.010*** 8.771*** 8.588*** 8.659*** 8.673*** 8.707*** 8.992*** 9.101*** 9.198*** 9.184*** 9.208*** 9.315*** 9.387***
(-3.292) (-3.226) (-3.19) (-3.152) (-3.123) (-3.116) (3.129) (3.143) (3.158) (3.184) (3.219) (3.253) (3.279)
     Member of Environmental 
Organization -8.377 -8.259 -8.265 -8.852 -9.044 -9.418 -9.711 -9.681 -9.495 -9.471 -9.232 -9.177 -9.064
(-8.803) (-8.638) (-8.611) (-8.497) (-8.398) (-8.393) (8.473) (8.582) (8.666) (8.836) (9.025) (9.054) (8.999)
Weather Controls  
     Heating Degree Hours 0.615** 0.573** 0.569** 0.548** 0.506* 0.441* 0.367 0.301 0.234 0.168 0.117 0.0990 0.0824
(-0.268) (-0.263) (-0.261) (-0.26) (-0.259) (-0.259) (0.261) (0.262) (0.264) (0.265) (0.266) (0.266) (0.266)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.839***
-
0.745***
-
0.746***
-
0.775***
-
0.809***
-
0.860***
-
0.954***
-
0.956***
-
0.949***
-
0.975***
-
0.917***
-
0.905*** -0.886***
(-0.202) (-0.193) (-0.193) (-0.191) (-0.184) (-0.185) (0.186) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.191) (0.194) (0.195)
Day-by-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 36.07 38.16 39.62 39.35 39.22 38.17 36.58 34.32 33.49 33.68 33.72 32.42 30.74
(-30.19) (-29.73) (-29.41) (-29.02) (-28.69) (-28.67) (28.89) (29.00) (29.09) (29.42) (29.87) (30.05) (30.03)
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Number of Observations 31,323,860
33,219,2
46
35,026,0
28
36,980,2
45
38,879,9
06
40,865,8
86
42,834,0
67
44,792,3
97
46,713,0
91
48,503,7
21
50,305,7
92
52,010,7
17
53,437,1
10
Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.0253 0.0257 0.0255 0.0254 0.0251 0.0249 0.0247 0.0244 0.0241 0.0238 0.0234 0.0234 0.0237
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention
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Figure 2. Distribution of Daily Treatment Effects
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Figure 3.  Participant Engagement
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Appendix 1. Energy Dashboard
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Appendix 2 Appliance Dynamics
Dynamic Treatment Effects at the appliance-level.
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Appendix 3 Website Analytics 
Table 4A. Weekly Engagement Metrics by Group
Cost Savings
Group
260 page entrances*
Health 
Group
752 page entrances*
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
T-
test
p-
value
Pageviews 16.7 10.9 1 49.3 40.3 23.8 2 91.8 .001
Unique Pageviews 14.8 9.1 1 41 32.6 16.1 2 66.3 .000
Time on Page (ms) 5,391 7,516 58 24,681 25,983 22,399 76 71,945
.002
Total Events** 166.1 245.8 5 717.8 2,093.8 2,485.1 7
6,936.
8
.004
* Page entrances are the number of initial dashboard entries by households via unique login. Pageviews track all website
page visits
** Total events count all click interactions throughout the website.
Table 4B. Website Page Entrances by Day of Week
Cost Savings 
Group
Health 
Group
Day of Week Panel
Freq.
Percent
%
Cum.
%
Panel
Freq.
Percent
%
Cum.
%
T test 
p-
value
Monday 350 8.7 8.7 786 10.2 10.2 .469
Tuesday* 2,045 50.9 59.7 3,444 44.7 55.0 .161
Wednesday 400 10.0 69.6 985 12.8 67.8 .363
Thursday 326 8.1 77.7 817 10.6 78.4 .433
Friday 432 10.8 88.5 633 8.2 86.6 .344
Saturday 190 4.7 93.2 408 5.3 91.9 .818
Sunday 272 6.8 100.0 624 8.1 100.0 .084
Total 4,015 100.0 7,697 100.0
* Weekly e-mail reminders were sent to participants on Tuesday mornings
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Appendix 4 Supplemental Analyses: Hourly Sampling
Table 5A. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention
First Intervention Period
Dependent variable: kWh @ 1 hr.
sampling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 hour 6 hours 12 hours 18 hours 24 hours 36 hours 48 hours 1 week
Experimental
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group
8.845 2.931 7.188 8.592 3.139 1.948 -2.446 -11.97***
(9.423) (12.80) (8.530) (6.281) (4.930) (4.412) (3.810) (3.676)
     Post-Treat*Health Group -9.369 -15.93*** -10.13** -8.888** -10.76*** -11.63*** -13.15*** -9.879***
(8.049) (5.291) (4.626) (4.232) (3.995) (3.929) (3.979) (3.247)
Household Characteristics
     Adults -2.815 -2.915 -2.998 -2.928 -2.944 -2.939 -2.903 -3.495
(9.351) (9.393) (9.390) (9.386) (9.372) (9.350) (9.319) (9.220)
     Children 10.59** 10.60** 10.59** 10.57** 10.57** 10.60** 10.61** 10.65**
(4.370) (4.373) (4.369) (4.367) (4.367) (4.360) (4.351) (4.332)
     Apartment Size (No. of bedrooms) 45.30*** 45.12** 44.99** 44.90** 44.89** 44.78** 44.53** 43.35**
(17.54) (17.54) (17.54) (17.54) (17.55) (17.53) (17.51) (17.45)
     Floor Plan (nominal square 
footage)
-0.0463 -0.0461 -0.0456 -0.0454 -0.0455 -0.0454 -0.0448 -0.0428
(0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0599)
     Building Floor 9.049*** 9.025*** 8.983*** 8.957*** 8.927*** 8.862*** 8.806*** 8.891***
(3.350) (3.350) (3.347) (3.345) (3.346) (3.336) (3.327) (3.297)
     Member of Environmental 
Organization
-3.526 -3.413 -3.415 -3.311 -3.329 -3.385 -3.284 -4.308
(10.01) (10.04) (10.04) (10.10) (10.10) (10.07) (10.12) (9.639)
Weather Controls
     Heating Degree Hours 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.784*** 0.782*** 0.769*** 0.783*** 0.766*** 0.757***
(0.258) (0.258) (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) (0.258)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.734*** -0.733*** -0.727*** -0.728*** -0.739*** -0.725*** -0.736*** -0.734***
(0.199) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.195)
Day-by-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 36.56 36.92 37.05 36.94 37.21 37.36 37.39 39.03
(34.19) (34.22) (34.21) (34.20) (34.17) (34.10) (34.03) (33.68)
Number of Observations 256,606 257,132 257,770 258,390 259,010 260,269 261,525 273,693
Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.0479 0.0479 0.0480 0.0479 0.0478 0.0479 0.0478 0.0480
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5B. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention (Hourly Sampling)
  Repeated Weekly Intervention: Persistence 
Dependent variable: kWh @ 1
hr. sampling (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
  2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks 7 weeks 8 weeks 9 weeks 10weeks
11
weeks
12
weeks
13
weeks
14
weeks
Experimental  
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group -10.99***
-
10.10***
-
9.137*** -6.694** -5.026* -3.485 -1.804 -0.350 0.781 1.946 2.696 3.252 3.785
(3.709) (3.727) (3.044) (2.866) (3.035) (3.286) (3.623) (3.813) (3.913) (4.079) (4.200) (4.316) (4.391)
     Post-Treat*Health Group -11.15***
-
10.50***
-
10.53***
-
10.61***
-
10.33***
-
9.938***
-
9.542*** -9.133** -9.220** -8.768**
-
8.223**
-
8.088** -8.214**
(3.263) (3.319) (3.249) (3.377) (3.496) (3.516) (3.626) (3.684) (3.861) (3.958) (4.053) (4.100) (4.120)
Household Characteristics  
     Adults -3.940 -2.954 -2.450 -1.788 -1.198 -0.657 -0.388 0.115 0.502 0.561 0.691 0.776 1.130
(7.727) (7.729) (7.686) (7.673) (7.661) (7.672) (7.688) (7.691) (7.705) (7.703) (7.712) (7.731) (7.741)
     Children -6.362 -5.484 -4.867 -4.191 -3.619 -3.107 -2.928 -2.432 -2.000 -1.951 -1.852 -1.783 -1.493
(8.076) (8.052) (8.015) (8.004) (7.991) (7.992) (8.000) (7.996) (8.022) (8.018) (8.028) (8.041) (8.042)
     Apartment Size (No. of 
bedrooms) -2.409 -2.159 -2.130 -1.823 -1.765 -1.476 -1.477 -0.550 -0.0682 -0.0592 0.0170 0.337 0.456
(9.120) (8.956) (8.826) (8.669) (8.540) (8.518) (8.633) (8.701) (8.736) (8.869) (9.076) (9.142) (9.053)
     Floor Plan (nominal square 
footage) 10.74** 10.77** 10.67** 10.62** 10.43** 10.48** 10.51** 10.60** 10.64** 10.59** 10.57** 10.70** 10.82**
(4.296) (4.283) (4.253) (4.241) (4.239) (4.226) (4.227) (4.231) (4.245) (4.268) (4.287) (4.294) (4.293)
     Building Floor 42.06** 40.15** 39.66** 38.20** 36.67** 34.96** 32.93* 32.16* 30.97* 30.56* 30.09* 29.39* 28.74*
(17.48) (17.44) (17.29) (17.13) (17.04) (17.00) (17.01) (17.02) (17.06) (17.14) (17.21) (17.30) (17.37)
     Member of Environmental 
Organization -0.0422 -0.0399 -0.0392 -0.0356 -0.0308 -0.0248 -0.0176 -0.0144 -0.0115 -0.00994 -0.00890-0.00684 -0.00363
(0.0593) (0.0590) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0588) (0.0592) (0.0595) (0.0598) (0.0604) (0.0609) (0.0614) (0.0616)
Weather Controls  
     Heating Degree Hours 0.733*** 0.703*** 0.700*** 0.683*** 0.656*** 0.603** 0.547** 0.496** 0.434* 0.365 0.315 0.296 0.284
(0.254) (0.249) (0.248) (0.247) (0.247) (0.248) (0.250) (0.251) (0.252) (0.253) (0.254) (0.254) (0.255)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.737*** -0.659*** -0.653*** -0.676*** -0.691*** -0.731*** -0.802*** -0.795*** -0.800*** -0.846***
-
0.828***
-
0.820*** -0.811***
(0.190) (0.185) (0.183) (0.184) (0.178) (0.181) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.187) (0.186)
Day-By-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 39.20 40.00 39.99 38.48 36.93 34.84 32.49 29.02 27.99 28.02 27.98 26.65 24.35
(33.25) (32.84) (32.52) (32.14) (31.85) (31.83) (32.04) (32.18) (32.23) (32.54) (32.94) (33.16) (33.14)
Number of Observations 290,935 308,059 324,605 342,148 359,349 377,160 394,736 412,351 429,685 445,933 462,275 477,789 490,994
Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
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R2 0.0487 0.0484 0.0481 0.0475 0.0468 0.0464 0.0460 0.0455 0.0447 0.0442 0.0435 0.0437 0.0444
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6A. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention (Hourly Sampling - Fixed Effects)
First Intervention Period
Dependent variable: kWh @ 1 hr.
sampling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 hour 6 hours 12 hours 18 hours 24 hours 36 hours 48 hours 1 week
Experimental
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group
8.842 2.927 7.185 8.589 3.137 1.946 -2.447 -11.97***
(9.423) (12.80) (8.531) (6.283) (4.931) (4.413) (3.811) (3.676)
     Post-Treat*Health Group -9.371 -15.93*** -10.13** -8.891** -10.77*** -11.63*** -13.16*** -9.885***
(8.049) (5.291) (4.624) (4.229) (3.992) (3.927) (3.977) (3.245)
Weather Controls
     Heating Degree Hours 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.784*** 0.782*** 0.769*** 0.783*** 0.766*** 0.757***
(0.258) (0.258) (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) (0.259)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.734*** -0.733*** -0.727*** -0.728*** -0.739*** -0.725*** -0.736*** -0.734***
(0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.195)
Day-by-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 99.47*** 99.46*** 99.40*** 99.43*** 99.56*** 99.41*** 99.58*** 99.68***
(2.529) (2.524) (2.520) (2.529) (2.533) (2.518) (2.519) (2.485)
Number of Observations 256,606 257,132 257,770 258,390 259,010 260,269 261,525 273,693
Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0043 0.0047
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6B. Dynamic Treatment Effects by Framing Intervention (Hourly Sampling - Fixed Effects
Model)
  Repeated Weekly Intervention: Persistence 
Dependent variable: kWh @ 1
hr. sampling (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
  2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks 7 weeks 8 weeks 9 weeks 10weeks
11
weeks
12
weeks
13
weeks
14
weeks
Experimental  
     Post-Treat*Cost Savings 
Group -10.98*** -10.10*** -9.138*** -6.696** -5.028 -3.487 -1.806 -0.353 0.779 1.944 2.693 3.250 3.783
(3.710) (3.727) (3.044) (2.866) (3.035) (3.286) (3.623) (3.813) (3.913) (4.079) (4.200) (4.316) (4.391)
     Post-Treat*Health Group -11.16*** -10.50*** -10.53*** -10.61*** -10.33*** -9.939*** -9.543*** -9.134** -9.221** -8.769** -8.224** -8.089* -8.215**
(3.263) (3.318) (3.248) (3.377) (3.496) (3.516) (3.626) (3.684) (3.861) (3.958) (4.053) (4.100) (4.120)
Weather Controls  
     Heating Degree Hours 0.733*** 0.703*** 0.700*** 0.683*** 0.656*** 0.602** 0.547** 0.495* 0.433* 0.365 0.315 0.296 0.284
(0.254) (0.249) (0.248) (0.247) (0.247) (0.248) (0.250) (0.251) (0.252) (0.253) (0.254) (0.254) (0.255)
     Cooling Degree Hours -0.737*** -0.659*** -0.653*** -0.676*** -0.691*** -0.731*** -0.802*** -0.795*** -0.801*** -0.846***
-
0.828***
-
0.820*** -0.811***
(0.190) (0.185) (0.183) (0.184) (0.178) (0.181) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.187) (0.186)
Day-By-Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 100.1*** 99.85*** 99.54*** 99.44*** 99.55*** 100.2*** 100.5*** 100.8*** 101.4*** 102.0*** 102.3*** 102.4*** 102.4***
(2.353) (2.274) (2.225) (2.166) (2.072) (2.006) (1.949) (1.911) (1.869) (1.818) (1.776) (1.770) (1.773)
Number of Observations 290,935 308,059 324,605 342,148 359,349 377,160 394,736 412,351 429,685 445,933 462,275 477,789 490,994
Number of Apartments 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.056 0.0062 0.0061 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0060 0.0054 0.0052 0.0050 0.0047 0.0048 0.0050
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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